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I. INTRODUCTION
There is growing sentiment that the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),1 which was "created to help fight
organized crime, is now being used primarily by private individuals
and corporations trying to extract large damage awards from legitimate businesses." 2 It has also been said that "RICO is upsetting the
• Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University School of Business.
B.A., DePauw University, 1976; J.D., The University of Chicago Law School, 1979.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
2. Diamond, Steep Rise Seen in Private Use of Federal Racketeering Law, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 1, 1988, at Al, col. 5.
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rules of the game in the areas of labor and employment law.... .,3
Nowhere is this more the case than in the area of potential employer
liability for employee discharges.
The issue of civil RICO liability for wrongful discharge is of great
practical importance in view of (1) the breadth of the RICO statute,
(2) the increasing use of the statute by private plaintiffs against business entities, including their former employers, and (3) the fact that a
successful RICO claim nets the plaintiff treble damages for injuries to
his business or property as a result of lost employment or employment
opportunities, as well as his attorney's fees and court costs. 4
The RICO statute is characterized by extraordinary breadth, so
perhaps it was inevitable that unhappy former employees would eventually discover it as a potential remedy for their loss of employment.
Congress added RICO to the Organized Crime Control Act of 19705 to
halt the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate business entities. 6 As written by Congress, however, the statute
prohibits behavior which is not limited to organized criminals. Section
1962 prohibits the acquisition, establishment, operation, or maintenance of an enterprise in interstate commerce through a pattern of
"racketeering activity," as well as a conspiracy to commit any of these
7
offenses.
However, the element of "racketeering activity" also includes conduct which does not fit within any accepted definition of that term.8 It
is defined in very broad terms as "acts involving" certain specifically
enumerated state1 0and federal criminal offenses, 9 often referred to as
"predicate acts."
State crimes that give rise to RICO charges are
those normally associated with racketeering,"1 but federal crimes that
serve as predicate acts under RICO include both racketeering-type
and nonracketeering-type crimes.' 2
3. Harrison, Look Who's Using RICO, 75 A.B.A. J. 56, 56 (Feb. 1989).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
5. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1988)).
6. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
8. Tarlow, Using the RICO Statute In Civil Litigation, NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1982, at
17, 20, col. 1.
9. Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest "Everybody's
Darling," 19 AM. CRns. L. REV. 655, 657 (1982).
10. Nathan, Civil RICO, 29 PRAc. LAW. 11, 16-17 (Dec. 1983).
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1988) (listing as predicate acts murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, and drug
dealing).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B)-(E) (1988) (listing as predicate acts, inter alia, mail
fraud, wire fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, bankruptcy fraud, extortion, interference by violence or threats of violence with interstate commerce, embezzlement from pension, welfare and other union funds, and interstate transportation
of stolen property).
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Among the remedies Congress included in the RICO statute is a
private right of action for treble damages available to anyone injured
in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.13 It
is this private right of action which is of primary and increasing concern to business. In each of the last two years, approximately 1,000
civil racketeering suits have been filed by private plaintiffs seeking to
recover triple their actual damages from legitimate businesses, including their employers.' 4 This figure represents a significant increase
compared to the 19 suits filed in 1981 and 117 filed in 1984.15 New
filings are averaging 85 a month, and such "private racketeering cases
now comprise about one-half of 1 percent of the 250,000 civil cases
filed each year in the Federal courts."16
This private civil RICO remedy is frequently being used by former
employees against legitimate business entities, and their standing to
do so has been upheld by several district courts.17 For example, on
June 13, 1988, two former Ashland Oil vice presidents won a $69.5 million civil RICO verdict against their former employer on the ground
that they were dismissed after questioning allegedly illegal foreign
payments and subsequent cover-up attempts.' 8 The jury found actual
damages, including lost compensation, to be $22 million, but the use of
the RICO statute tripled the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiffs.19 Similarly, an employee of Boise Cascade Corporation, who had
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). See also infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
Diamond, supra note 2, at Al, col. 5.
Id
Id. at B4, col. 6.
See, ag., Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Acampora v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 635 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1986). In addition, on April 18, 1989, a
former employee of Texaco Trading and Transportation, Inc. filed suit under civil
RICO, charging that he was terminated from his position for refusing to participate in the company's racketeering schemes. The plaintiff is seeking more than
$770,000 in actual damages for the loss of past and future wages and benefits,
which would total $2.3 million when trebled under RICO, as well as $1 million in
exemplary damages and $500,000 in damages for pain and suffering. As of May 1,
1989, none of the defendants had responded to the complaint. Wade v. Texaco
Trading & Transp., No. 89-C-316B (D. Okla. filed April 18,1989) (also discussed in
4 Ind. Employ. Rts. (BNA) No. 7, at 2 (May 9,1989); 4 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No.
47, at 4 (May 2, 1989)). See aso infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
18. See Diamond, supra note 2, at B4, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 14, 1988, at D1, col. 3;
Wall St. J., June 14,1988, at 5, col. 1; 4 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 1 (June 14,
1988).
19. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the RICO claims on the ground
that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under RICO because they were not directly
damaged by the predicate acts. Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 641 (E.D. Ky.
1988). However, the district court denied the defendants' motions for summary
judgment on the RICO claims. Id at 644. The jury then returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs on the RICO claims on June 13,1988. See N.Y. Times, June
14, 1988, at D1, col. 3; Wall St. J., June 14, 1988, at 5, col. 1; 4 Civ. RICO Rep.
(BNA) No. 3, at 1 (June 14, 1988). The defendants originally appealed the jury's
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been discharged after discovering that an operations manager was
stealing from the corporation, successfully brought suit under civil
RICO for three times the actual financial loss resulting from the loss
of her job.20
However, the availability of the civil RICO remedy in such situations is far from definitively established, for there is a division of authority in the lower federal courts as to whether Congress intended to
afford discharged employees a civil remedy under the RICO statute in
these circumstances. One line of cases appears to hold that discharged
employees, including so-called "whistleblowers," 21 lack standing to
sue under RICO because they have not been directly damaged by the
commission of acts prohibited by the statute.22 As noted above, the
other line of cases has permitted civil RICO actions to go forward in
such circumstances. 23 Moreover, in courts which allow such actions, it
is unclear whether employees can recover under RICO after merely
being discharged for "tattling" about their employers' illegal acts, or
whether they can only recover when they are discharged for refusing
to participate in these illegal acts. 24
This potential liability of the employer is made all the more treacherous by the fact that the former employee who files a civil RICO lawsuit for treble damages is also able to impose vicarious liability upon
the business itself for the acts of its other employees.25 In other
words, the business entity is liable for the actions of an employee who
is responsible for wrongfully discharging another of its employees,
verdict, but on August 23, 1988, Ashland Oil agreed to pay $25 million to the
plaintiffs to settle the lawsuit. 4 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 2 (Sept. 13,
1988).
20. Acampora v. Boise Cascade Corp., 635 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D.N.J. 1986). For a more
detailed discussion of the case, see infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
21. For a definition and examples of whistleblowing, see generally S. KOHN & M.
KOHN,THE LABOR LAwYER's GUIDE TO THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF EMPLOYEE WHISTLEBLOWERS 1 (1988); Dworkin & Near, Whistleblowing Statutes:

Are They Working?, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 241, 243-44 (Summer 1987).
22. See infra notes 114-57 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 17 and accompanying text and infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
24. Compare Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1217 (5th Cir. 1988)
(whether an employee is discharged for reporting a RICO violation or for refusing to participate in a RICO violation, in neither situation does the discharge flow
from the predicate acts, and "thus, both fail to meet the causal nexus required
under the statutory language of section 1964(c) and under Sedima") with Morast
v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 933 & n.8 (11th Cir. 1987) (the court implied that there
might be standing if plaintiff is fired for refusing to participate in the employer's
illegal acts, but found no standing when plaintiff is fired for merely reporting the
employer's illegal acts).
25. See generally Ginger, Using RICO to Reach into the CorporatePocket Vicarious
Civil Liability of the Business Entity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct, 93 DicK. L. REv. 465 (1989) (discussion of vicarious liability of the business entity under civil RICO).

EMPLOYERS' RICO LIABILITY
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even if the misbehaving employee is quite low on the corporate
totem
26
pole or is acting contrary to express corporate instructions.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently declined a
chance to clear up the confusion among the circuits over the issue of
whether or not former employees have standing under civil RICO to
sue their employers for wrongful discharge. 27 The Court was
presented with a case wherein a former corporate chief financial officer alleged that he was fired because he had opposed the plan of certain corporate directors to control the corporation through illegal
racketeering activities. Because he was neither a target nor a direct
victim of the predicate acts, the district court found that the former
employee had no standing to maintain a RICO action.2s This holding
was affirmed on appeal, 29 and the former employee asked the
Supreme Court to review the case.30 Despite the conflict among the
lower courts, however, the Court denied his petition for certiorari,
leaving the issue unresolved.31
This Article will delineate the present state of the law as to RICO
liability for wrongful discharge. In Part II of the Article, the general
requirements for standing under civil RICO will be discussed, including the statutory language on standing and the judicial interpretations
of that language. Part III of the Article will examine how the courts
have analyzed and applied the statutory language in the specific context of wrongful termination cases filed under civil RICO.
II.
A.

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVIL RICO STANDING
The Statutory Language of Section 1964(c)

Section 1964(c) of the RICO statute creates a private civil right of
action in favor of anyone who has been injured in his business or property by reason of a criminal violation as provided in section 1962.32
26. Id at 482.
27. Diamond v. Reynolds, 109 S. Ct. 392 (1988), denying cert. to 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.

1988).
28. See Diamond v. Reynolds, No. 84-280 (D. Del. July 15, 1986) (mem.) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file).
29. Diamond v. Reynolds, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988). The unpublished opinion is
available in Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, at App. A, Diamond v. Reynolds, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 392 (1988) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari].
30. Diamond v. Reynolds, petitionfor cert.filed 57 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Sept. 19,1988)

(No. 88-486).
31. Diamond v. Reynolds, 109 S. Ct. 392 (1988).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). Section 1964 provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of

section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id For the criminal provisions of the Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
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Therefore, only persons injured "by reason of a violation of section
1962" have standing to sue under civil RICO.33 This "by reason of"
language has generally been read to impose a proximate cause requirement on plaintiffs wishing to sue under section 1964(c), 34 requiring
proof that the criminal conduct violating section 1962 injured the
plaintiff's business or property.3 5 Thus, to have standing to sue under
civil RICO, one must prove that he has suffered an injury to his business or property which was proximately caused by a violation of section 1962 of the Act.
However, this standing requirement is not as straightforward in
practice as it sounds in theory. The courts have never been able to
agree upon exactly what the causal link must be between the defendant's RICO violation and the harm suffered by the plaintiff for civil
RICO standing to exist.3 6 The courts have also been unable to resolve
the issue of what kind of RICO violation it is which must cause the
plaintiff's injury. To have standing under civil RICO, is it sufficient
for the plaintiff to be injured by the predicate acts alone, or must he be
injured by the pattern of racketeering resulting from those acts, or,
alternatively, by the acquisition, establishment, operation, or maintenance of an enterprise through that pattern of racketeering?37
33. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) ("the plaintiff only has
standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his
business or property by the conduct constituting the violation" of section 1962).
34. See, e.g., Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1214 (5th Cir. 1988) ('"The
language 'by reason of' in § 1964(c) imposes a proximate causation requirement
on plaintiffs."); Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1988) ("It is clear that
both direct and indirect injuries must be proximately caused."); Haroco, Inc. v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984) ("As we read
this 'by reason of' language, it simply imposes a proximate cause requirement on
plaintiffs."), qff'd per curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985). See also Matthews, Best, Tabor, Nathan & Weisman, Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, A.B.A.
SEC. CoRp., BANKING & Bus. L. 288 (1985) [hereinafter Matthews].
35. See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir.
1984) ("The criminal conduct in violation of section 1962 must, directly or indirectly, have injured the plaintiff's business or property."), aff'd per curiam, 473
U.S. 606 (1985). See also Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Prods., 831
F.2d 596, 606 (6th Cir. 1987); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc.,
615 F. Supp. 828, 834 (N.D. Ill.
1985).
36. See City of Milwaukee v. Universal Mortgage Corp., 692 F. Supp. 992, 996 (E.D.
Wis. 1988) ("Exactly what the link must be between the conduct of the RICO
violation and the harm alleged by the victim has been viewed by courts from two
related and often combined perspectives: one dealing with whether the injured
party is the real party in interest under Rule 17(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., and the other
dealing with whether the RICO violation was the proximate cause of the injury.")
(footnote omitted).
37. See, e.g., Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1149 (10th Cir. 1989)
(standing under section 1962(a) requires proof of injury by the use or investment
of racketeering income, not merely injury caused by the predicate acts themselves as required in section 1964(c)); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d
1211, 1215 (5th Cir. 1988) (standing under section 1964(c) exists if plaintiff is in-
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This is a troublesome issue for civil RICO plaintiffs generally, but
it is especially troublesome for wrongful discharge plaintiffs. Courts
have generally acknowledged that plaintiffs can recover under RICO
for loss of employment opportunities 3S and that loss of employment or
employment opportunities qualifies as "injury to business or property" within the meaning of RICO.39 However, wrongful discharge is
not listed in section 1961(1) of the RICO statute as an underlying predicate act or "racketeering activity," nor is it listed as a full-blown
40
RICO violation in any of the subsections of section 1962 of the Act.
Therefore, it is literally impossible for any civil RICO complaint
based upon wrongful discharge to allege that the plaintiff was directly
injured by either a predicate racketeering act or acts, by a pattern of
two or more such acts, or by one of the specific violations listed in
section 1962. Thus, the civil RICO standing of any such plaintiff must
by definition rely upon an injury to business or property "indirectly"
caused by, or "flowing from," some behavior prohibited by the RICO
statute. The purportedly legal issue raised in this situation is actually
jured by "racketeering activities forbidden by § 1962"); Brandenburg v. Seidel,
859 F.2d 1179, 1184, 1187, 1189 n.11 (4th Cir. 1988) (standing under all subsections
of section 1962 requires injury caused by predicate acts); Bankers Trust Co. v.
Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096,1100-01 (2d Cir. 1988) (standing under subsections (a), (b),
and (c) requires only injury from the predicate acts); Environmental Tectonics v.
W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1067 (3d Cir. 1988) (standing under section
1962(a) requires injury caused by some or all of the predicate acts); Town of
Kearny v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d 1263, 1268 (3d Cir.
1987) ("IThe injury which confers standing on a RICO plaintiff is injury flowing
from the commission of the predicate act, not injury flowing from the pattern of
such acts."); City of Milwaukee v. Universal Mortgage Corp., 692 F. Supp. 992, 997
(E.D. Wis. 1988) ('"Recovery under RICO is limited to those injuries that are
caused by the predicate acts."); Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank,
693 F. Supp. 666, 672 (N.D. IlM.1988) ("[A] plaintiff can have standing to bring a
§ 1962(a) claim as long as it has been injured by a predicate act."); P.M.F. Servs. v.
Grady, 681 F. Supp. 549, 556 (N.D. IlM.1988) ("[UIn each instance the specific subsection of Section 1962 makes the violation not the conduct of racketeering activity alone, but rather the use of that racketeering activity in the particular way the
subsection declares unlawful."); Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot & Mannino,
P.C., 670 F. Supp. 597, 599 (W.D. Pa. 1987) ("Standing to maintain a private civil
RICO action depends on whether the plaintiff suffered 'direct injury' by the conduct which violates section 1962.") (citation omitted); Kouvakas v. Inland Steel
Co., 646 F. Supp. 474, 477 (N.D. Ind.1986) (injuries did not flow from predicate
acts, so plaintiff had no standing). See also Matthews, supra note 34, at 288 &
nn.439-40.
38. Cf Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 531
(1988) (although recovery for lost employment opportunities was denied in the
case, the court did "not hold that plaintiffs may never recover under RICO for
the loss of employment opportunities").
39. See, e.g., Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 348 (1st Cir. 1987); Acampora v.
Boise Cascade Corp., 635 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D.N.J. 1986); Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F.
Supp. 1097, 1101 (D. Mass. 1986).
40. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-62 (1988).
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a policy question: Is a discharge based upon a plaintiff's knowledge or
reporting of, or refusing to participate in his employer's RICO violation the kind of injury for which a civil RICO remedy ought to be
available?
B.

Judicial Interpretations of Section 1964(c): Do Indirectly Injured
Plaintiffs Have Standing?
1.

The United States Supreme Court's Interpretation

No answer is found on the face of section 1964(c) to the questions
raised above regarding the sort of causation required for standing, the
sort of injury required for standing, or whether standing exists under
civil RICO for wrongfully discharged employees. Resort must be had,
therefore, to the court decisions interpreting section 1964(c) on the
general issue of standing to file a civil RICO claim. (Court decisions
on the issue of civil RICO standing for wrongful discharge will be specifically treated in Part III below.)
The only United States Supreme Court decision to address the is4
sue of standing under section 1964(c), Sedima, S.P.RL. v. Imrex Co., 1
did so in the context of an examination of two specific restrictions on
RICO standing which had been imposed by the circuit courts. One
such restriction was the requirement that in order to have standing, a
RICO plaintiff must not only establish an injury resulting from the
predicate acts themselves,
but he or she must also establish a so-called
"racketeering injury" 42 which is an indirect injury because it does not
directly result from the commission of the predicate acts.43
The Court held that in order to have standing under the statute, a
civil RICO plaintiff is not required to prove a "racketeering injury" in
addition to an injury resulting directly from the predicate acts themselves. 44 In so doing, the Supreme Court arguably expanded standing
under RICO by adding plaintiffs who are injured directly by the predicate acts to the universe of plaintiffs with standing under RICO, while
41. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).

42. Id at 481.
43. The district court in Sedima had held that a RICO complaint must allege an injury "apart from that which would result directly from the alleged predicate acts
of mail fraud." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963, 965 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on
the ground that Sedima's complaint had failed to allege an "injury different in
kind from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was
designed to deter." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482,496 (2d Cir. 198 ,).
See also Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1988) ("By damages caused
only 'indirectly' we mean 'racketeering' injury, 'competitive' injury or injury
caused by the total effect of the pattern of racketeering in the enterprise."). See
supra text immediately following note 40.
44. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1988).
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at the same time holding that those who had suffered indirect injury
continued to have standing under section 1964(c) of the Act.45 In the
words of a district court which considered this very point,
[W]hile the defendants assert that the indirect injuries alleged by the
[plaintiff] are not the type of injury contemplated by § 1964(c), there is no
indication of such a limitation in the Sedima case. Indeed, the issue confronted in Sedima was not whether indirect injury from the racketeering enterprise was recoverable but whether direct injury from the predicate acts was
sufficient to allow recovery. The Court implicitly accepted the premise that
the injurious consequencesof the enterpriseother than the injury directly attributable to the fraudulent acts themselves would be recoverable.4 6

However, some of the Court's language in Sedima has been interpreted, and arguably misinterpreted, to grant RICO standing only to
those suffering direct injury while denying it to those injured indirectly by the RICO violations.47
In Sedima, the Court addressed the specific issue of what was required for standing to exist in a RICO case premised on section
1962(c), 48 but its broad language can be applied to cases alleging a violation of any of the subsections of section 1962.49 The Court held that
a civil RICO plaintiff need only prove that he has suffered an injury
flowing in some unspecified way from the defendant's commission of
the predicate acts: "Where the plaintiff alleges each element of the

violation, the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by
predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern ....
Any
recoverable damages occurring by reason of a violation of § 1962(c)
will flow from the commission of the predicate acts." 50
The question left unanswered by this statement centers upon the
45, See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at 43-45 ("In Sedima this Court read
RICO broadly and decided to thereafter grant RICO standing to those victims
directly injured by the predicate acts. But all nine justices agreed that those victims injured indirectly by the racketeering, i.e., those with 'racketeering injury',
'indirect injury,' or 'competitive injury' had standing, and would continue to have
standing, under RICO.").
46. Philatelic Found. v. Kaplan, No. 85 Civ. 8571 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1986) (mem.)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479, 497 & n.15 (1985)) (emphasis added).
47. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. Such an interpretation leaves no room
for standing based upon wrongful discharge, which, as was pointed out above, is
by definition an indirect result of the commission of the predicate acts.
48. Section 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
49. See Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 693 F. Supp. 666, 671 (N.D.
Ill. 1988).
50. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) (footnote omitted).
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meaning of the phrase "will flow from the commission of the predicate
acts." In its footnote to this phrase, the Court appears to have included injuries caused either directly or indirectly by the predicate
acts in its definition of "recoverable damages," for it states that "[s]uch
damages include, but are not limited to, the sort of competitive injury
for which the dissenters would allow recovery."5 1 The majority's reference to "the sort of competitive injury for which the dissenters
would allow recovery" refers to indirect injury and alludes to the
three examples offered by Mr. Justice Marshall on behalf of the four
dissenters. 52 These examples were offered in an effort to illustrate
and define the concept of a "racketeering injury," which the dissenters
would have required in addition to direct injury for RICO standing to
exist.5 3
The "racketeering injuries" mentioned in the examples appear to
illustrate primarily anticompetitive effects of racketeering and include being forced out of business by monopolization resulting from
threats, arson, and assault; being forced to pay more for the monopolist's goods or services, resulting in added costs of doing business; being
forced to pay protection money, purchase certain goods, or hire certain
workers, resulting in added costs; being displaced as an investor in a
legitimate business by a racketeer who gains control of the business
through racketeering; and losing competitive position to an enterprise
which enhances its profits or its economic power, and therefore its
54
competitive position, through racketeering.
Although Mr. Justice Marshall would permit recovery for such indirect "racketeering injury," he would deny recovery for any of the
injuries resulting directly from the predicate acts perpetrated by the
racketeers in his examples. 55 He would not permit recovery, for instance, for the cost of the building burned in the arson, for injury resulting from the threats or assault, or for monetary injuries suffered
by the customers of or investors in the racketeer-infiltrated
56
business.
It seems clear that the majority, in stating that the damages recoverable under RICO "include, but are not limited to, the sort of competitive injury for which the dissenters would allow recovery,"5 7 held
that plaintiffs who have suffered either direct or indirect injuries have
standing to sue under civil RICO.58 Indeed, the majority's very next
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 497 n.15.
See id at 520-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
I&
Id. at 521-22. See also Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at 46-48.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 521 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 521-22. See also Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at 46-48.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.15 (1985).
See Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1988); Bass v. Campagnone, 838
F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1988).
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statement makes clear the soundness of this analysis:
Under the dissent's reading of the statute, the harm proximately caused by
the forbidden conduct is not compensable, but that ultimately and indirectly
flowing therefrom is. We reject this topsy-turvy approach, finding no warrant
in the language or the history of the statute for denying recovery thereunder
to "the direct victims of the [racketeering] activity," while preserving it for the
indirect.5 9

Thus the proper interpretation of the Sedimna decision with regard
to civil RICO standing would seem to be that plaintiffs injured either
directly or indirectlyby racketeering activity have standing to bring a
private civil suit under the Act. The Court's language is best interpreted as establishing that, while plaintiffs are not required to allege
an indirect "racketeering" injury in order to recover under civil RICO,
they are certainly permitted to recover on the basis of such an indirect
injury, as well as on the basis of a direct injury. As a result of this
holding, the Court expanded standing under RICO, not narrowed it,
by reading the statute broadly and granting for the first time standing
to those suffering direct injury alone, while at the same time preserv60
ing standing for those who have suffered indirect injuries.
As was seen above in the discussion of Mr. Justice Marshall's examples and in the majority's reference to them, 6 1 all nine Justices appeared to agree that those victims injured indirectly by racketeering
activity had standing, and would continue to have standing, under
RICO.62 The dissenters wanted to restrict standing to only those with

indirect injury, while the majority ruled that those who had suffered
direct injury also had standing. In the words of one court that has

considered the issue, "[t]o allow a RICO action only when the plaintiff
is the direct victim of the predicate racketeering activities..,

would

be to ignore the essence of a RICO violation, which is the commission
of racketeering activities in connection with the conduct of an enter-

prise."6 3 In short, the majority's ruling should not be viewed as having

had any effect on the preexisting standing of plaintiffs who have suffered indirect injury. However, this is precisely how some courts have

viewed it.

59. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,497 n.15 (1985) (citation omitted). On
the proper interpretation of this footnote, see Bass v. Campagnone, 838 F.2d 10,12
(1st Cir. 1988) ("In the footnote... the Court made clear that damages could be
recovered for those injuries indirectly caused by predicate acts, as well as those
directly caused by them.").
60. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at 14.
61. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
62. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at 43-45, 49-51.
63. Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, 632 F. Supp. 1430, 1433 (N.D. Ml1.1986) (citing Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985)).
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2. Conflict Among the Lower Courts
The lower federal courts are in sharp conflict on the issue of
whether the Sedima decision stripped standing from RICO victims
suffering indirect injury. 64 While some courts have held that indirect
injury is sufficient to confer RICO standing, other courts have denied
RICO standing to anyone not injured directly by the predicate acts. 65
As noted above, the United States Supreme Court refused to settle the
question, denying certiorari in a recent case posing the very issue.66
Several circuit courts of appeals decisions disapprove of the very
dichotomy used to frame the question. In Alexander Grant & Co. v.
Tiffany Industries,67 the court held that an accounting firm claiming
that its former client falsified audit data had standing based on injury
it suffered from the costs attendant to a Securities and Exchange
Commission investigation, lost fees, and harm to its business reputation.68 In so doing, the court disapproved of the approach used in
other circuits and went so far as to say that it found "no legislative
history supporting the direct-indirect dichotomy."69 On remand, the
court readopted this standing ruling and took the opportunity to comment on the impact of the Sedima decision which had been rendered
in the interim. 70 The court stated that "[t]he brief mention of causation in Sedima cannot fairly be interpreted as reading into section
1964(c) a direct injury versus indirect injury distinction." 71
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Bass v. Campagnone72 offered an alternative method of analysis to one focusing on whether or
not the injury was direct or indirect. The court concluded that
Sedima "establishes a broad standard for determining when a person
64. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at 16-18; National Enters. v. Mellon Fin.
Servs. Corp. No. 7,847 F.2d 251,253 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Whether an indirect injury is
sufficient to constitute standing in a RICO action is a contested question among
the federal courts."); Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639,641 (E.D. Ky. 1988) ('TIhis
division of authority seems to reflect a disagreement among the circuits as to
whether a plaintiff may sue under § 1962(a) or (c)on the basis of an indirect
injury from the predicate acts.").
65. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. See also Petition for Certiorari,
supra note 29, at 14-35.
66. Diamond v. Reynolds, 109 S. Ct. 392 (1988), denying cert. to 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.
1988). See also infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
67. 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded,473 U.S. 922 (1985), standing
rulingreadopted on remand,770 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, Kahn
v. Alexander Grant & Co., 474 U.S. 1058 (1986).
68. Id. at 411-12.
69. Id. at 412.
70. Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 770 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.15 (1985)), cert. denied, Kahn v.
Alexander Grant & Co., 474 U.S. 1058 (1986).
71. Id. For a discussion of footnote 15 in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
497 n.15 (1985), see supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
72. 838 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988).
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is injured 'by reason of' a section 1962 violation: the inquiry in [sic]
not whether the plaintiff has alleged a direct or indirect injury, but
rather whether he or she has alleged an injury that 'flows from' the
73
predicate acts."

Finally, in a relatively recent case, the Fifth Circuit also relied on
the "flows from" language in the Sedima case, remarking that "a requirement that the nexus between the injury and a predicate act be
'direct' may, at least in some circumstances, be overly restrictive." 74
However, most other courts considering the issue of RICO standing
do use the direct/indirect analysis. For instance, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals stated in Haroco, Inc. v. American NationalBank &
Trust Co.75 that for standing to exist, "[t]he criminal conduct in violation of section 1962 must, directly or indirectly, have injured the plaintiff's busfness or property." 76 Inherent in this holding, of course, is
the ruling that indirect injury is sufficient to grant RICO standing.
Several other courts have agreed with this ruling, finding that injury
resulting indirectly from the predicate acts confers standing in a RICO
action. 77 However, a clear majority of the cases has held that only
73. Id at 12.
74. Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823, 833 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.15 (1985)). However, the Fifth Circuit appears to
have reached the same result as those courts which explicitly require direct injury, in that it later held that "the predicate acts constitute both (1) factual (but
for) and (2) legal (proximate) causation of the alleged injury." Ocean Energy I v.
Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 744 (5th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
75. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (decision
handed down with Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)).
76. Id at 398 (emphasis added). This language was recently cited with approval by
the same court in Flip Side Prods. v. Jam Prods., 843 F.2d 1024, 1035 (7th Cir.
1988).
77. See, eg., Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1988) ('"The majority [in
Sedima] evidently agreed that at least some kinds of indirect injury are recoverable.. . .") (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.15 (1985));
Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Prods., 831 F.2d 596, 606 (6th Cir.
1987) (" "e criminal conduct in violation of section 1962 must, directly or indirectly, have injured the plaintiff's business or property.' ") (quoting Haroco, Inc.
v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd per
curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1987)
("Recovery under RICO ... is not limited to direct victims.") (citing Sedima,
S.P..L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1985)); Terre Du Lac Ass'n v. Terre
Du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 1985) ('"This court has previously held
that standing to pursue a RICO action exists even though the plaintiff does not
allege that it was a target of the racketeering activity and even though the plaintiff only alleges that it suffered indirect injury.") (citing Alexander Grant & Co.
v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 408,411 nn.7 & 8 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded
forfurtherconsiderationin light of Sedima, 473 U.S. 479 (1985)), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1082 (1986)); Miller v. Glen & Helen Aircraft, 777 F.2d 496, 498-99 (9th Cir.
1985) (allegation that investigator conspiracy caused portion of insurance proceeds to be paid to investigator, thereby depleting final settlement to plaintiff,
demonstrated sufficient causal connection for RICO standing) (citing Sedima,
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plaintiffs directly injured by the predicate acts have standing to sue
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1985)); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984) (The "by reason of" language
of section 1964(c) means that "[t]he criminal conduct in violation of section 1962
must, directly or indirectly, have injured the plaintiff's business or property."),
aff'd per curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus.,
742 F.2d 408, 411 nn.7 & 8 (8th Cir. 1984) (accounting firm sued client whose mail
and wire fraud enabled it to remain in business for extended period before SEC
investigation and which caused firm lost fees, expenses of investigation, and loss
of business reputation; these allegations sufficient to confer RICO standing), vacated and remandedfor further consideration in light of Sedima, 473 U.S. 922
(1985), standing ruling readopted on remand, 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, Kahn v. Alexander Grant & Co., 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); Lewis v. Lhu, 696 F.
Supp. 723, 727 (D.D.C. 1988) ("An allegation that plaintiff was the target of the
predicate fraudulent acts is unnecessary. All that is required to sustain standing
under RICO is an allegation that plaintiffs' injuries flowed, directly or indirectly,
from defendants' fraudulent acts."); Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 642 (E.D.
Ky. 1988) ("IT]he logical conclusion from the opinion of the Court in Sedima is
that indirect injury is a sufficient basis for a RICO claim under section 1962(a) or
(c).") (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.15 (1985)); Komm
v. McFliker, 662 F. Supp. 924, 928 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (Eighth Circuit is "holding
firm in allowing RICO recoveries when the illegal conduct has indirectly harmed
the plaintiff.") (citing Terre du Lac Ass'n v. Terre du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467, 473
(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986)); Wooten v. Loshbough, 649 F.
Supp. 531, 535-36 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (A judgment creditor's allegations that defendants prevented her from collecting judgment on products liability claim by stripping judgment debtor of ability to survive judgment stated RICO claim because
RICO statute "contains no requirement that.., the civil RICO plaintiff be the
victim of the predicate acts."); Acampora v. Boise Cascade Corp., 635 F. Supp. 66,
69 (D.N.J. 1986) (An employee who was discharged because she discovered a manager's thefts and RICO violations had RICO standing even though she did not
allege she was injured directly by the predicate offenses because "[h]er injury
flowed from defendant's commission of a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with the conduct of an enterprise."); Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, 632 F. Supp.
1430, 1433 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("To allow a RICO action only when the plaintiff is the
direct victim of the predicate racketeering activities.., would be to ignore the
essence of a RICO violation .... Plaintiff has alleged a competitive injury resulting from defendants' infiltration ....
It is not necessary for [plaintiff] to allege
that it was the target of the predicate fraudulent acts, as long as it was the victim
of the dishonest operation of an enterprise."); SJ Advanced Tech. & Mfg. Corp. v.
Junkunc, 627 F. Supp. 572, 576 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("Nothing blocks an injured competitor from calling on civil RICO" even when predicate acts are directed at third
parties.); Philatelic Found. v. Kaplin, No. 85 Civ. 8571 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1986)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("While the defendants assert that the indirect
injuries alleged by the [plaintiff] are not the type of injury contemplated by
§ 1964(c), there is no indication of such a limitation in the Sedima case. Indeed,
the issue confronted in Sedima was not whether indirect injury from the racketeering enterprise was recoverable but whether direct injury from the predicate
acts was sufficient to allow recovery. The Court implicitly accepted the premise
that the injurious consequences of the enterprise other than the injury directly
attributable to the fraudulent acts themselves would be recoverable.") (citing
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.15 (1985)); Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 645 F. Supp. 675, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Plaintiffs need not
allege that they were personally defrauded by defendants; rather, they need only
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under civil RICO.78
allege that they were injured by reason of a scheme to defraud."), acff'd, 820 F.2d
46 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 698 (1988); Rodonich v. House Wreckers
Union, Local 95, 627 F. Supp. 176, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("It is not necessary for
plaintiffs to allege that the predicate acts are directly responsible for the injury as
long as the injury flows from the predicate acts."); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare,
N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828,834 (N.D. 1. 1985) (allegations of proximate
cause between kickbacks by subcontractor to contractor's employee and subcontractor's faulty concrete work satisfied requirement that plaintiff be injured "by
reason of" RICO violation in that kickback may have depleted subcontractor's
funds to point it was unable to perform work completely or adequately) (citing
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.15 (1985)); Callan v. State
Chemical Mfg., 584 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (former sales representatives
had RICO standing based upon allegations that they were discharged for refusing
to commit bribery pursuant to company policy even though predicate offense did
not injure them directly).
78. See, e.g., Ocean Energy II v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 744 (5th
Cir. 1989) ("[A] person will be considered injured 'by reason of' a RICO violation
if the predicate acts constitute (1) factual (but for) causation and (2) legal (proximate) causation of the alleged injury."); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865
F.2d 527,529 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[ln order to establish standing, [plaintiff] must show
that the damage to his business or property resulted from.., the predicate acts
constituting the violation in this case."), afftr 677 F. Supp. 228, 230 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("Plaintiff's alleged injuries... did not flow directly from the predicate
acts. Plaintiff was not injured 'by reason of' [defendant's] alleged fraud and
therefore has no standing to bring a civil RICO suit."); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l
Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1215,1217-18 (5th Cir. 1988) (employees fired for reporting a
RICO violation (whistleblowers) or for refusing to participate in a RICO violation
do not have standing to sue under RICO for injury caused by loss of their jobs
because discharge does not flow from the predicate acts); Diamond v. Reynolds,
853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988) (discharge for objecting to RICO conspiracy or to prevent reporting of conspiracy cannot provide basis for RICO standing where plaintiff not a target of the conspiracy) (Petition for Certiorari, supranote 29, App. A,
at 1-35), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 392 (1988); National Enters. v. Mellon Fin. Servs.
Corp. No. 7, 847 F.2d 251, 254-55 (5th Cir. 1988) (creditor of RICO victim lacks
standing to sue RICO perpetrator because creditor not injured by conduct constituting RICO violation, nor was harm caused by the predicate acts); Bass v.
Campagnone, 838 F.2d 10,12-13 (1st Cir. 1988) (individual members of union local
lack RICO standing because they allege injury to local collectively rather than to
themselves individually); NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931, 937 (4th Cir.
1987) (Stockholders of a corporation suffer when the corporation incurs loss, but
only the corporation may vindicate its rights because of the principle, applicable
to RICO cases, that "[ain indirectly injured party should look to the recovery of
the directly injured party, not the wrongdoer, for relief."); Town of Kearny v.
Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[Ihe injury which confers standing on a RICO plaintiff is injury flowing from the commission of the predicate act, not injury flowing from the pattern of such acts.");
Crocker v. F.D.I.C., 826 F.2d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 1987) (minority shareholders of
defunct bank injured by decline in value of bank stock stated no direct, personal
injury distinct from that suffered by corporation, and therefore, had no standing
to assert their RICO claim in a nonderivative action); Marshall & lsley Trust Co.
v. Pate, 819 F.2d. 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1987) (RICO plaintiff must prove it suffered
direct injury from at least one of the predicate acts constituting the RICO pattern); Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, 829 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1st Cir. 1987)
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As noted above, the United States Supreme Court recently declined an opportunity to resolve this split among the lower courts regarding whether or not indirectly injured plaintiffs have standing
(plaintiff fired, slandered, and otherwise injured because he reported and tried to
stop illegal RICO schemes had no RICO standing because the acts that injured
him were not caused by the predicate acts alleged in his complaint); Morast v.
Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 933 (11th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff not fired because he refused to
participate in defendant's illegal scheme but because he reported it; therefore, his
injury did not flow directly from banking violations which were the predicate acts
and RICO standing not present); Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 349 (1st
Cir. 1987) (plaintiff fired for reporting illegal scheme had no standing because his
firing did not violate RICO, and "[the RICO Act provides no cause of action to
individuals injured by acts other than criminal RICO violations"); Rand v. Anaconda-Ericcson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1986) (shareholders who alleged
that corporation's bankruptcy was caused by RICO violation of creditor, affiliates,
and other parties lacked standing to assert RICO claim against these parties because RICO action is corporate asset which shareholders cannot bring in their
own names without impairing rights of prior claimants); Warren v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 759 F.2d 542, 544-45 (6th Cir. 1985) (neither shareholder who lost
value nor employee who lost his job when corporation forced into bankruptcy by
RICO violations had standing because violations were directed toward corporation and any injuries directly caused by RICO violations were to corporation);
Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1174-76 (7th Cir. 1985) (under RICO, because "an
indirectly injured party should look to the recovery of the directly injured party,
not to the wrongdoer, for relief," taxpayers who paid higher county taxes because
of defendant's bribery of county officials had no RICO standing); Cenco Inc. v.
Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir. 1982) ("It is unlikely that Congress if it had adverted to the issue would have chosen to create in the wake of
every RICO violation waves of treble-damage suits by all who may have suffered
indirectly from the violation ....
), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Hecht v.
Commerce Clearing House, 713 F. Supp. 72, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (The plaintiff's
injuries in loss of job "were [not] proximately caused by either his conduct as a
'whistle blower' or a 'non-participant'."); City of Milwaukee v. Universal Mortgage Corp., 692 F. Supp. 992, 997 (E.D. Wis. 1988) ("Recovery under RICO is limited to those injuries that are caused by the predicate acts."); Mid-State Fertilizer
Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 693 F. Supp. 666, 672 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("[A] plaintiff
can have standing to bring a section 1962(a) claim as long as it has been injured by
a predicate act."); Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot & Mannino, P.C., 670 F. Supp.
597, 599 (W.D. Pa. 1987) ("Standing to maintain a private civil RICO action depends on whether the plaintiff suffered 'direct injury' by the conduct which violates section 1962."); Kouvakas v. Inland Steel Co., 646 F. Supp. 474, 477 (N.D. Ind.
1986) (personal injuries resulting from plaintiff's loss of employment were not
business or property damages that flow from commission of predicate acts, so
plaintiff had no RICO standing); Dana Molded Prods. v. Brodner, 58 Bankr. 576
(N.D. ll. 1986) (creditor of bankrupt corporation did not have standing to assert
RICO claim for fraud committed against the corporation); Gallagher v. Canon
U.S.A., 588 F. Supp. 108, 110 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (shareholders who sue under RICO
for injury to corporations in which they hold stock have no standing to bring
nonderivative RICO action); Levey v. E. Stewart Mitchell, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1030,
1034-35 (D. Md. 1984) (mem.) (those indirectly injured by racketeering activities
may not maintain a private action under RICO), aff'd, 762 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1985)
(renumbered No. 84-1597).
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under RICO.79 Hence, the conflict in the lower federal courts on this
issue remains unsettled.
III. RICO STANDING IN THE WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE CONTEXT
The conflict in the lower federal courts on the issue of whether
indirectly injured plaintiffs in general have standing to sue under
RICO is mirrored in those courts' decisions dealing specifically with
the issue of whether wrongful discharge plaintiffs, who by definition
have suffered indirect injury,8 0 have RICO standing. Courts have upheld the general propositions that plaintiffs can recover under RICO
for loss of employment opportunitiessl and that loss of employment or
employment opportunities qualifies as "injury to business or property" for purposes of the RICO statute.8 2 However, because wrongful
discharge is not specifically mentioned in the statute as a predicate act
(or "racketeering activity"),8 3 nor as a full-blown RICO violation,84
the connection between the conduct constituting the RICO violation
and the discharge is necessarily a tenuous one.
Because the relationship between the defendant's RICO violation
and the plaintiff's injury due to a wrongful discharge designed to facilitate the RICO violation is so indirect, the courts fall back upon the
direct/indirect injury method of analysis when they are faced with the
question of whether a plaintiff suing for wrongful discharge has standing to bring a civil RICO action.8 5 As a result, there is a division of
authority in the lower federal courts as to whether Congress intended
to afford discharged employees a civil remedy under RICO in these
86
circumstances.
Although the better interpretation of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Sedima, S.P.RL. v. Imrex Co.87 would be to find that
indirect injury is sufficient to confer RICO standing,8 8 the majority of
lower federal courts refuse to do so, ruling that only plaintiffs directly
79. Diamond v. Reynolds, 109 S. Ct. 392 (1985), denying cert. to 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.
1988) (No. 88-486). For a complete discussion of the case, see infra notes 158-66
and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at 59. Compare infra notes 92-113 and
accompanying text with infra notes 114-57 and accompanying text.
87. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
88. See, e.g., Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 642 (E.D. Ky. 1988) ("[IThe logical
conclusion from the opinion of the Court in Sedima is that indirect injury is a
sufficient basis for a RICO claim.") (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479, 497 n.15 (1985)). See also supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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injured by the predicate acts have standing to sue under the statute.8 9
Four district court panels have ruled that plaintiffs wrongfully discharged for reporting or refusing to participate in RICO violations do
have standing to bring a civil RICO suit.90 However, seven circuit
courts in five different circuits and three district court panels have
held that such plaintiffs have no standing to sue under RICO.91
A.

Court Decisions Granting RICO Standing to Discharged Employees

The four district court opinions granting civil RICO standing to discharged employees present a mixed picture. In the earliest of the four
opinions, Callan v. State ChemicalManufacturing Co.,92 former sales
representatives of a chemical company, which marketed its products
exclusively through the use of commercial bribery, sought treble damages under section 1964(c) of RICO on the ground that they had been
discharged in retaliation for refusing to engage in the bribery scheme
which itself violated RICO.93 The defendant contended that the plaintiffs' injuries were not caused "by reason of" its alleged violations of
section 1962 as required for standing under section 1964(c). 94 The district court responded to this argument in a rather conclusory fashion,
stating that the plaintiffs' contention "that they lost income and were
discharged as a result of the fact that the affairs of [the defendant]
were conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity.., is sufficient under Section 1964."95
The court implied that if the plaintiffs had alleged only injuries
stemming from the predicate offenses they would have had no standing, and that they did have standing because they alleged instead injuries stemming from the relationship between the predicate offenses
and the enterprise. 96 The district court panel found that the plaintiffs'
injuries were "by reason of" a violation of section 1962 because they
were injured not by the predicate offense of commercial bribery itself,
but by "the fact that [defendant] adopted commercial bribery as a
mandatory sales technique." 97 Thus, the case seems to be one in
which the discharge was in retaliation for a refusal to participate in
the pattern of racketeering activity, and standing was based upon injury from that pattern and not upon injury from the predicate acts
themselves.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 114-57 and accompanying text.
584 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
Id at 620.
Id at 623.
Id
Id.
Id
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The next case which granted standing to a discharged employee
came two years later and both cited and followed Callan. However, it
did not involve a discharge for refusal to participate in racketeering,
but rather an attempt to cover up racketeering by terminating a woman with knowledge of it. In Acampora v. Boise Cascade Corp.,9g a
discharged employee alleged that her former employer's operations
manager harassed her and caused her to be fired in an effort to cover
up a racketeering scheme she had discovered in which the manager
had stolen from the employer and later resold the goods.99 The court
found that the plaintiff had standing to sue the operations manager
despite the fact that she did not allege that she was injured directly by
the defendant's predicate acts of stealing because "[h]er injury ...
flowed from defendant's commission of a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with the conduct of an enterprise."'100 The court
"explained" this rather conclusory holding as follows:
Plaintiff claims that defendant, in his position as a manager in the corporation, engaged in an overall scheme which consisted of the commission of the
predicate acts and the cover-up of those activities, which caused plaintiff to
lose her job. In a similar case, the court found that while the predicate offense, commercial bribery, did not cause injury to plaintiff, the loss of plaintiff's employment for refusing to participate in bribe schemes was
compensable under RICO as an injury "by reason of" a violation of § 1962. We
are persuaded that plaintiff's alleged injury is sufficiently related to defendant's alleged illegal conduct to enable her to maintain this action.' 01

The third district court opinion granting RICO standing to a discharged employee, Komm v. McIliker,102 appears to have involved a
"pure" whistleblower situation, in which the plaintiff was not fired for
refusing to participate in racketeering or in an effort to cover up racketeering, but merely in retaliation for reporting racketeering. The
court noted that while courts in other circuits had denied RICO standing to whistleblowers on the ground that their discharge "is only indirectly caused by the pattern of illegal conduct alleged,"103 its own
circuit court of appeals
seems to be holding firm in allowing RICO recoveries when the illegal conduct has indirectly harmed the plaintiff. Therefore, although plaintiff does
not claim that he was terminated for refusing to act illegally... he does now
allege a claim04for which he could apparently receive relief in this Circuit,
under RICO.'
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

635 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1986).
I& at 67.
Id. at 69.
Id (citation omitted).
662 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (the court did not recite the facts underlying the
plaintiff's RICO claim other than to say that it was based upon his being discharged for whistleblowing).
103. I& at 927.
104. Id at 928 (citation omitted).
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The court's opinion is devoid of any other statement of the rationale
for its decision.
The final and most recent district court case granting RICO standing to discharged employees involves terminations designed to cover
up racketeering, but its actual holding was based upon a different theory than the coverup case described above. In Williams v. Hall,105
two former vice presidents of Ashland Oil Company alleged that for
several years Ashland Oil conducted the procurement phase of its operations in part by illegally bribing officials of Middle Eastern countries in violation of both the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and of
RICO.106 The plaintiffs "charge[d] that when they refused to participate in these illegal activities and refused to cooperate in the coverup
that necessarily resulted, they were discharged from their employment."'10 7 The defendants moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the "plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under RICO because
they were not directly damaged by the predicate acts."108
The district court noted "a disagreement among the circuits as to
whether a plaintiff may sue under § 1962(a) or (c) on the basis of an
indirect injury from the predicate acts,"1 09 and then noted that its own
circuit "seems to be leaning toward the view that indirect injury is
sufficient."11 0 After asserting that "the logical conclusion from the
opinion of the Court in Sedima is that indirect injury is a sufficient
basis for a RICO claim under § 1962(a) or (c)," however, the district
court declined to resolve that issue and based its holding in the case on
a different theory.l11
The plaintiffs in Williams had argued in the alternative that they
could meet the causation requirement for RICO standing even if direct causation were required because they were directly injured by
section 1962(d), which prohibits a conspiracy to violate any other subsection of section 1962 of the statute.112 The court seized upon this
opportunity to recast the issue presented to it and to rule upon the
issue as recast:
The issue is thus presented: Does a plaintiff have standing to sue under RICO
if he can show the existence of a conspiracy to violate RICO, prohibited by
§ 1962(d), and that some overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy
were prohibited predicate acts under Section 1961, but his only injury was
caused by other overt acts, which were not "predicate acts." The court holds
105. 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
106. I& at 640.
107. Id
108. Id. at 641.
109. I&
110. Id.
111. Id. at 641-42.
112. Id. Section 1962(d) reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988).
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that this issue must be resolved in favor of plaintiffs and that they have standing to suefor their discharge and resultingdamage if they can prove that the
terminationswere overt acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy to operate
Ashland through a pattern of racketeeringactivity as defined by the RICO

statute.113

B.

Court Decisions Denying RICO Standing to Discharged Employees

Although four district court panels have conferred RICO standing
for wrongful discharge based upon what might be termed four different rationales, the majority of the district courts and all of the courts
of appeals that have treated the issue have ruled that employees of an
alleged RICO violator claiming derivative injury based on predicate
acts directed at their employer's clients or some other third party have
not been injured in their business or property "by reason of" a violation of section 1962, and therefore do not have standing to sue under
civil RICO. n 4 Most of these decisions seem to be based upon the assertion that the plaintiffs therein have no standing because they were
not actually injured "by" the predicate acts, and their authors often
cite each other.
1. Decisions of the United States CircuitCourts of Appeals
The earliest circuit court of appeals decision reaching this conclusion is Morast v. Lance." 5 In Morast a former bank officer alleged
that he was discharged in retaliation for reporting to the Comptroller
of the Currency irregular banking transactions which violated RICO
and for cooperating with the Comptroller's subsequent investigation.'1 6 The plaintiff further alleged that he was discharged because
of a conspiracy in violation of RICO in that "the only way defendants
could continue their illegal scheme was to rid the bank of those people
7
who would not 'go along' with the plan," including the plaintiff."
However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that because
the plaintiff was not fired for a refusal to participate in the bank's
illegal scheme, his "injury, his discharge, did not flow directly from
the predicate acts, the defendants' banking violations."" 8 Accordingly, the court ruled that he had no standing to sue under RICO.
The next two circuit court decisions to deny RICO standing in
these circumstances were from the First Circuit Court of Appeals. In
Nodine v. Textron, Inc.,n 9 the plaintiff alleged that the defendants vi113. Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 642 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (emphasis added).
114. See Foster, Netzer & Moriarty, Causation In Civil RICO After Sedima, 4 Civ.
RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2 (April 25, 1989).
115. 807 F.2d 926 (11th Cir. 1987).
116. Id. at 929.
117. Id. at 932-33.
118. Id. (footnote omitted).
119. 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987).
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olated RICO and Canadian customs laws and covered up these acts,
and that he was fired because he reported the customs scheme to his
superiors. 120 Citing Sedima and Morast, the court held that Nodine
was not "injured by RICO violations" in that
[h]is injury resulted from Textron's decision to fire him after he reported the
customs scheme to his superiors. Firing Nodine under these circumstances
was wrong, but it did not violate the RICO Act. Thus, William Nodine was not
"injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation."
Accordingly, he lacked standing to bring a RICO suit. 12 1

The other First Circuit case to deny RICO standing for wrongful
discharge is Pujol v. Shearson/American Express. 2 2 That case involved a former Shearson officer who charged that he was fired because he took action to report and stop RICO predicate acts consisting
of illegal banking transactions, defrauding of investors, and mail and
wire fraud. The Pujol court explicitly followed Nodine despite the
fact that Nodine was fired in retaliation for reporting racketeering,
whereas Pujol was dismissed to prevent him from reporting racketeering. 2 3 The court found this distinction to be irrelevant and devoid of
any meaningful concrete application, stating that in any event, either
sort of dismissal would be "an action independent of" the racketeering
scheme and therefore not a violation of the RICO statute sufficient to
confer standing under section 1964(c).1 24
The next case in this series, Cullom v. HiberniaNationalBank,25
cited Morast, Nodine, and Pujol in support of the proposition that
"[w]histle blowers do not have standing to sue under RICO for the
injury caused by the loss of their job."126 The court elaborated only to
the extent of saying that "being discharged for either reporting a
RICO violation or refusing to participate in a RICO violation does not
flow from the predicate acts; thus, both fail to meet the causal nexus
required under the statutory language of § 1962(c) and under
Sedima."127 In support of its decision, the court also mentioned the
fact that the plaintiff was neither the victim nor the target of the pred1 28
icate acts.
A contemporaneous Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Diamond v. Reynolds,29 involved a former corporate officer who charged
120. I- at 347-49.
121. Id. at 349 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)) (citation omitted).
122. 829 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir. 1987).
123. Id at 1205.
124. Id.
125. 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988).
126. Id. at 1215.
127. Ic at 1217.
128. Id. at 1218.
129. 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988) (unpublished opinion available in Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, App. A, at 1-35), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 392 (1988).
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that he was fired for opposing a plan to control the corporation
through racketeering. The Diamondcourt also cited Morast,Nodine,
and Pujol in support of its holding that a discharged plaintiff had no
standing to sue under RICO. The court held that whether Diamond
was discharged in retaliation for objecting to the alleged conspiracy or
to prevent him from reporting the conspiracy, his dismissal "did not
flow from the commission of the predicate acts." 3 0 Therefore, the
court felt that he was not injured "by reason of a violation of section
1962," as is required for standing to exist under the Act.131 As will be
discussed below, the United States Supreme Court recently refused to
32
review this decision.1
The next circuit court opinion on the issue also denied RICO standing to a discharged employee. In Burdick v. American Express Co., 1 3 3
a former vice president of Shearson Lehman Brothers alleged that he
was terminated as a result of numerous complaints he made to his
supervisor and others about racketeering activities engaged in by the
firm and its employees. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that Burdick had no standing to bring a civil RICO suit because he did
not allege in the complaint that his own business or property was injured as a result of the predicate acts of racketeering committed by the
defendant.34
The final and most recent circuit court opinion to decide the issue
also denied RICO standing to a whistleblower. In Norman v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp.,135 the plaintiffs were former nuclear power
plant quality assurance auditors. They' claimed that they were the victims of harassment and intimidation, false performance evaluations,
disparaging reports damaging to their careers, and reassignments
which amounted to demotions, all in retaliation for reporting various
plant violations and defects to company management and to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.136
The plaintiffs filed complaints with the Department of Labor in
1985 under the Energy Reorganization Act, which requires employees
to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of statutory violations
or safety defects, prohibits employers from discharging or discriminating against "whistle-blowing" employees, and permits employees who
believe that they have been improperly discharged or discriminated
against to file a complaint with the Department of Labor.137 The De130. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, App. A, at 8-9.
131. Id. at 8.
132. Diamond v. Reynolds, 109 S. Ct. 392 (1988), denying cert to 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.
1988). See infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
133. 865 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1989).
134. Id at 529.
135. 873 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1989).
136. Id. at 635.
137. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, §§ 206, 210, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5846, 5851 (1982).
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partment of Labor dismissed one plaintiff's complaints for failure to
meet a thirty-day limitation period and dismissed the other's after an
administrative law judge found that the defendant was not conspiring

to harass or retaliate against

13
him. 8

In 1986 the plaintiffs filed suit under RICO, alleging that Niagara
engaged in a pattern of racketeering in furtherance of a scheme to
conceal from its shareholders, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and the New York Public Service Commission construction deficiencies, excessive costs, and management failures at the plant.13 9 They
also alleged that they were victims of a related scheme to ruin anyone
who threatened the company's ability to hide the true state of affairs
at the plant.140
The district court dismissed the RICO claim and the Second Circuit
affirmed that dismissal on three grounds. The circuit court ruled that
the administrative remedy provided under the Energy Reorganization
Act was the exclusive remedy for whistleblowers in the plaintiffs' situation, and that the plaintiffs' RICO claim was barred under res judicata principles because it made the same allegations as complaints
which had been previously dismissed by the Labor Department and in
a separate district court action.141 However, the court also held that
RICO standing "requires that there be a causal connection between
the prohibited conduct and plaintiff's injuries."1 42 The court concluded that no such causal nexus existed between the plaintiffs' inju3
ries and the defendant's alleged RICO violations.14
2. Decisions of the United States DistrictCourts
Three district court panels have also denied RICO standing for loss
of employment. In a very recent case, Hecht v. Commerce Clearing
House,144 a former employee claimed that he was fired for insisting on
rectifying and refusing to participate in allegedly fraudulent sales
practices which violated RICO. In dismissing the suit, the court held
that the plaintiff lacked standing for several reasons.
The court first noted that it had previously "refused to recognize a
plaintiff's standing for 'whistle blowing.' "14 The court then followed
Cullom in ruling that Hecht also lacked standing as a "non-participant" in the company's alleged scheme because "the act of 'not participating' is legally indistinguishable from the act of 'whistle blowing' for
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id at 636.

I&
Id at 637-38.
Id at 636.
Id
713 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Id at 74.

1989]

EMPLOYERS' RICO LIABILITY

the purpose of standing analysis under RICO."146 The court also held
that Hecht's injuries were not proximately caused by his conduct as
either a whistleblower or a non-participant,147 and noted that he was
neither the target, the competitor, nor the customer of the alleged
racketeering enterprise.148
In Kouvakas v. Inland Steel Co.,1 49 the plaintiff charged that defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering by causing fraudulent
invoices and other documents to be mailed to Inland Steel's customers,
thereby falsely assuring them that Inland Steel employees had inspected the customers' goods and that the goods were conforming. 5 0
Spiro Kouvakas alleged that defendants harassed and abused him
when he refused to participate in the fraudulent scheme, causing him
to become physically disabled and lose his job.151 The court found that
the alleged predicate acts were falsification of inspection documents,
and that the plaintiff had not shown that he was injured "by reason
of" these acts.15 2 Therefore, summary judgment was granted to the
3
defendant on the civil RICO claim.5
Finally, in another district court case, Jones v. Baskin, Kaherty,
Elliot & Mannino, P.C.,154 a discharged attorney sued the law firm
that had fired him, alleging, among other things, predicate racketeering acts of tax and mail fraud which had caused injury "'in his business, property rights, contractual rights and employment.' "155 The
court held that because "[s]tanding to maintain a private civil RICO
action depends on whether the plaintiff suffered 'direct injury' by the
conduct which violates section 1962," and "neither the acts of tax
fraud nor mail fraud themselves directly caused the injuries suffered
by the plaintiff," he had no civil RICO standing. 56 The Jones court
also cited Morast in support of its decision. 5 7
C. The Issue in the United States Supreme Court
On November 14, 1988, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Diamond v. Reynods.158 As noted above, Diamondwas a
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id at 75.
Id at 76.
Id,
646 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
Id at 476.
Id.
Id at 477.
Id.
670 F. Supp. 597 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
Id at 599 (quoting the plaintiff's complaint). The plaintiff did not elaborate upon
or explain this rather summary allegation.
156. Id. at 599-600.
157. Id at 600.
158. 109 S. Ct. 392 (1988), denying cert to 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988).
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wrongful discharge case which squarely presented the issue of
whether the Supreme Court's expansion of RICO standing in Sedima
to include those directly injured by the predicate acts simultaneously
eliminated RICO standing for those who had suffered indirect injury,
as some lower courts had been interpreting that decision.1 5 9 The Diamond case involved a former corporate chief financial officer who alleged that he was fired because he opposed the plan of certain
corporate directors to control the corporation through illegal racketeering activities in violation of RICO.160
The district court held that Diamond "does not have standing
under Sedima, because he was not 'injured... by the conduct constituting the [RICO] violation'." 161 The district court reached this conclusion on the basis of its statement that
the discharge of plaintiff may have assisted defendants' alleged scheme, but
the discharge in itself is not conduct constituting a violation of RICO. The
persons injured by the alleged racketeering acts of [defendant] are the shareholders .... They alone have standing to bring a RICO action containing the
type of allegations made by plaintiff. Plaintiff, however, represents himself
only and has
never asserted that he is bringing suit on behalf of the sharehold16 2
ers ....

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment on the basis of its own reading of Sedima,
stating that
Diamond's dismissal did not flow from the commission of the predicate acts
.... [W]hether Diamond was discharged in retaliation for objecting to the
alleged conspiracy or to prevent him from reporting the conspiracy, he does
not have RICO standing .... Diamond was not a target-either directly or
indirectly-of the alleged criminal conduct, and his discharge cannot provide
the basis for RICO standing. The district court properly held that Diamond's
discharge was not sufficiently linked
to the predicate acts that comprised the
163
pattern of racketeering activity.

Diamond, the discharged former employee, asked the United
States Supreme Court to review the case. 1 6 4 His petition stated that
certiorari should be granted for the three following reasons:
1. to resolve the conflict among nine circuits as to whether victims with
"racketeering injury" also known as "indirect injury" have RICO standing
2. because the decision below holding that Sedima restricted RICO standing, conflicts with this Court's decision in Sedima, and
3. because the fact pattern in this case, an employee fired for opposing
159. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at i.
160. Diamond v. Reynolds, No. 84-280, (D. Del. July 15, 1986) (mem.) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file). See also Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at 6-10.
161. Diamond v. Reynolds, No. 84-280, (D. Del. July 15, 1986) (mem.) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file).
162. Id
163. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, App. A, at 9-10.
164. Diamond v. Reynolds, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 57
U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1988) (No. 88-486).
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RICO violations, is being frequently
presented to the federal courts and is re165
sulting in conflicting decisions.

Nonetheless, the Court denied his petition,166 and the conflict
remains.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the better reading of the United States Supreme Court
decision in Sedima, S.P.RL. v. Imrex Co. would be to find that both
directly and indirectly injured plaintiffs have standing under civil
RICO,167 the majority of the lower federal courts have generally ruled
that only those plaintiffs suffering direct injury of some sort may sue
under section 1964(c) of the Act.168 In addition, the majority of courts
to address the issue have held specifically that plaintiffs filing suit
under civil RICO for loss of employment have no standing to bring
such a suit. 1 6 9 Courts' positions on the issue of civil RICO standing for
wrongful discharge appear to be dictated by their policy stance on the
issue of whether a RICO remedy ought to exist in a particular situation rather than by any principled analysis of the problem. This approach makes difficult any predictions about when such a remedy is
available to discharged employees.
Those courts which have granted civil RICO standing based upon
wrongful discharge have done so in cases involving plaintiffs who refused to participate in racketeering,170 plaintiffs who reported racketeering,171 plaintiffs who merely had knowledge of racketeering but
had not taken any action to report it,172 and plaintiffs who had both
refused to participate in and reported racketeering.? 3 All of these decisions seem premised at bottom upon the conclusion that such discharges constitute injury caused by a pattern of racketeering in
connection with the operation of an enterprise, and that as a matter of
public policy, loss of employment in such a situation is an injury "by
reason of" a RICO violation even though it is not caused directly by
the predicate acts. Even in the case which granted standing on an alternative theory but declined to decide the issue of whether indirect
injury such as loss of employment is sufficient to confer RICO standing, the court intimated that it was.174
Similarly, that majority of courts which has denied civil RICO
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
160.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at 13.
Diamond v. Reynolds, 109 S. Ct. 392 (1988).
See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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standing based upon loss of employment appears also to have done so
based upon a policy judgment, though this judgment has been disguised as a factual inquiry into causation. Some of the cases refuse to
find standing in such a circumstance on the ground that a person who
is discharged has not been "directly" injured in his own business or
property "by" or "by reason of" the predicate acts committed by the
defendant.175 Similarly, other cases have denied standing on the
ground that the discharge "did not flow from the predicate acts." 176
Two cases hold that a person who is discharged for reporting racketeering activity is not injured by a RICO violation as required by section 1964(c) because the termination of employment in retaliation for
whistleblowing, though wrong, is not itself a RICO predicate act.177
Therefore, it appears that the trend of decisions is clearly toward
denying civil RICO standing for wrongful discharge. Moreover, those
wishing to buck this trend will have a difficult time, for they will have
to argue that the courts' policy decision on the issue is in error, a much
harder undertaking than attempting to show a court that its reading of
a statute or of a Supreme Court decision is in error. Moreover, because wrongful discharge is by definition an injury which results only
indirectly from a RICO violation, 7 8 plaintiffs' attorneys will be unable to meet the majority of courts' requirement that civil RICO plaintiffs allege and prove direct injury. As a result, the prospect of
bringing a successful civil RICO claim based upon wrongful discharge
seems dim under the current state of the law.

175.
176.
177.
178.
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See
See
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